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A CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY
ENLISTMENTt
Neil J. Dilloff*
Since July 1, 1973, this nation has had what is termed an "all-
volunteer military."' As a result, the primary means available for
an individual to enter military service has become the enlistment
contract. This article will explore whether or not this type of agree-
ment is, in fact, a contract. We shall analyze what documents or
acts are necessary to comprise this agreement between a volunteer 2
and the United States; whether a military enlistment agreement
satisfies the traditional contractual elements, such as mutual as-
sent, consideration, and capacity to contract; what is the effect of
conditions stated in the contract; and, finally, breach and remedies
for breach.
Before analyzing the agreement itself, it is important to describe
how the courts and commentators have attempted to categorize it.
One of the favorite definitions used by courts in grappling with the
nature of the enlistment contract is:
Enlistment is a contract; but it is one of those contracts which
changes the status; and, where that is changed, no breach of the
contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations
which its existence imposes.3
* A.B., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1970; J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center, 1973. The author is presently serving in the Litigation and Claims Division,
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
t Views expressed in this article are to be considered the views of the individual author
and do not purport to promulgate or voice the views of the Judge Advocate General, the
Department of the Navy, or any other Agency or Department of the United States.
1. This was accomplished by order of President Nixon. See 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS 20; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
2. A "volunteer" is one who freely and of his own accord offers himself for service in the
Armed Forces. 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 21 (1937). This article will limit its discussion of
the "volunteer" to only those persons, who after enlisting, become non-officers, or enlisted
personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 104(4) (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 261 (1970). A volunteer should be
distinguished from an "inductee" who is a person brought into the military through the
Selective Service System and from a commissioned officer, who is appointed by the President.
3. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 (1890). See also Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393,
402 (1961); Chavez v. Fergusson, 266 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Adams v. Clifford, 294
F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D. Hawaii 1969).
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The same court went on to state:
By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His relations to the state
and the public are changed. He acquires a new status . . . . He
cannot of his own volition throw off the garments he has once put on
4
From the above, it can be seen that both contract and status are
involved in the transition from a civilian to a member of the armed
forces.5 Some courts have spoken in terms of, and rested their deci-
sions solely on status.' Many courts have talked in terms of contract,
but have rested their decisions on a change in status.7 One court has
been straightforward in its discussion of the two theories of contract
and status and has meshed them into a reasoned, well-explained
decision.8 Other courts have spoken strictly in terms of contract
law? The modern trend and the best view, according to this author,
is the latter line of cases.
One further quote may serve to further characterize the general.
nature of an enlistment contract:
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more
distinctly federal in character than that between it and members of
its armed forces . . . the scope, nature, legal incidents and conse-
quences of the relation between persons in service and the Govern-
4. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890).
5. For a discussion of status and contract see Casella, Armed Forces Enlistment: The Use
and Abuse of Contract, 39 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 783 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Casella].
6. Taylor v. Resor, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 405, 406, 42 C.M.R. 7, 8 (1970); United States v. Noyd,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 490, 40 C.M.R. 195, 202 (1969); United States v. Blanton, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
664, 666, 23 C.M.R. 128, 130 (1957). See also Richardson, Incidents of the Government-
Servant Relationship, 54 MICH. L. Rzv. 633 (1956).
7. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd
337 U.S. 49 (1949); Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Metz v. United
States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969); In re McBee, 287 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal. 1968);
Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968).
8. Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554, 556-57 (D. Colo. 1968).
9. Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Schwartz v. Franklin, 412 F.2d 736
(9th Cir. 1969); Larinoff v. United States, Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973);
Bemis v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186
(N.D. Tex. 1971), afl'd 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972); Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.
Cal. 1971); Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968); Even v. Clifford, 287 F.
Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
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ment are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed
by federal authority. 10
I. THE COMPONENTS OF THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT
What documents, public laws, or acts comprise the "enlistment
contract?" Courts have had various answers to this question. The
reason for this inconsistency is that there is a maze of forms, docu-
ments, statements, statutes, regulations, and an oath, all of which
have been held, individually and in different combinations, as well
as all collectively, to be the "enlistment contract."" The reason for
describing just what documents, laws, or acts make up the enlist-
ment contract is that we must have a "thing" to which we can apply
our contractual analysis.
Although the various branches of the armed service have some-
what differing documents which make up the agreement, it can be
generally stated that there are four basic components: (a) the enlist-
ment instrument, Department of Defense Form 4-"Enlistment
Contract-Armed Forces of the United States;" (b) an oath of alle-
giance which may be either verbal or written; 2 (c) a statement of
understanding; 3 and (d) the applicable federal statutes and regula-
tions. 4
A. The Enlistment Instrument: Department of Defense Form 4
One commentator has stated that this instrument, "is, according
to armed forces regulations, 'the basic document establishing a legal
relationship' between an enlistee and the federal Government.' 5 In
United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman,6 the court held that the
failure to sign the enlistment instrument voluntarily, was conclusive
and the petitioner, who sought release from the Navy, was granted
10. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947).
11. For a discussion of this topic see Casella, supra note 5.
12. When written, it usually is contained in Department of Defense Form 4-Enlistment
Contract-Armed Forces of the United States (Feb. 1, 1970).
13. This may be a separate document or it may be incorporated into Department of De-
fense Form 4, supra note 12.
14. For purposes of this article, these are defined as all statutes and regulations whether
directly concerned with recruitment, enlistment or not, which may subsequently affect the
volunteer and his obligations under the contract.
15. Casella, supra note 5.
16. 296 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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a writ of habeas corpus. The court also rejected the Government's
argument that the performance of duties, acceptance of pay, and
the acceptance of food and housing brought about a "constructive
enlistment" or a ratification.
In Norman, the oath of enlistment was part of the written enlist-
ment form. The court stressed the role of this instrument and the
oath contained therein:
The enlistment contract "must be completed whenever an individual
enlists . . ." (citations omitted) . . . . "The member must sign the
Enlistment Contract in the presence of the officer administering the
oath of allegiance."
The short of it is that because he did not take the oath of enlistment,
either orally or in writing, Norris did not enlist in the United States
Navy on August 7, 1967. By the same token, the Navy could have sent
Norris home for his refusal to take the oath since it was not bound
either. For, as Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, "It is the actual enlist-
ment, the oath of allegiance, that changes the status from a civilian
to a soldier." United States v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 354,
359, 39 S. Ct. 294, 63 L. Ed. 643; 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 21 (2)
at p. 392. 7
The main elements of an enlistment were further described by the
court in Goldstein v. Clifford" as being the enlistment instrument
and the statutory law in effect when the instrument was signed. 9
B. The Oath of Allegiance
The oath of allegiance has also been characterized by courts as
the key event in the enlistment process.'" In Petition of Agustin,2'
parol evidence was allowed to establish whether or not an oath of
allegiance was taken." The court characterized the oath itself as
17. Id. at 1274. Note, however, that the instant case turned on the additional fact that even
though Norris later signed the enlistment document, his consent was involuntarily coerced
by threat of a court-martial. Id. at 1275.
18. 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968).
19. Id. at 279.
20. In In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 157 (1890), the oath was referred to as the "pivotal fact"
in enlistment.
21. 62 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
22. Id. at 835.
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"the fact of enlistment" (emphasis supplied) .13 United States ex rel.
Norris v. Norman, supra, apparently subscribes to this view.
More recently courts have treated the oath as a necessary but not
sufficient step in the enlistment process. In Pfile v. Corcoran,24 the
court stated:
Respondent's contention that the oath of enlistment constitutes the
enlistment contract is untenable. While taking the oath may be a
step which formalizes the enlistment, and without which there is no
binding enlistment, this does not compel the conclusion that all the
terms of enlistment become subservient to the final oath. . ...
Finally, the total lack of the oath, was characterized as a nonfatal
defect in United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson.2 6 The case in-
volved the validity of an agreement to extend an enlistment by a
serviceman. This situation, although somewhat different from a
person who enlists for the first time, shows the trend toward con-
tract law and away from the rigid formalities associated with past
characterizations of the enlistment as a change in status.27
C. The Statement of Understanding
The principal case which expressly holds that the statement of
understanding is the enlistment contract is Pfile v. Corcoran.28 The
court looked at other components of the agreement, such as the oath
and the enlistment instrument, and concluded that because of the
detailed and specific wording of the statement of understanding as
well as its physical appearance, it "constituted the enlistment con-
23. Id.
24. 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968).
25. Id. at 557.
26. 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Chalfant v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1969).
27. Other cases with language minimizing the importance of the formalities, such as the
oath, which are associated with enlistment are: In re Agustin, 62 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal.
1945) (despite the fact that the court held the oath was essential, it also stated that, in
general, other formalities in enlistment were not fatal to the enlistment); In re Stevens, U.S.
24 Law Rep. O.S. 205. Contra, In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Coe v. United States, 44
Ct. Cl. 419 (1909).
6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 21, at 392 (1937) states "[flormalities should be complied
with," but "[m]ere informalities should not invalidate the enlistment." See also United
States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
28. 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968). See also Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
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tract [and] . . . that to the extent petitioners' enlistment [was]
governed by contract terms, the statement of acknowledgment con-
stituted that contract." (Emphasis added). 9
It seems logical that the statement of understanding, which spells
out the duties and obligations of the parties, should be considered
the enlistment contract, rather than the oath, which primarily goes
to status, or the enlistment instrument, which largely contains per-
sonal data and which is used for inductees as well as volunteers.
D. Statutes and Regulations
However much signed documents such as the enlistment instru-
ment, the written oath, and the statement of understanding,
whether collectively or individually, appeal to the reader as consti-
tuting "the enlistment contract," one cannot escape the overriding
effect of statutes and regulations on the enlistment obligation. For
example, in Rehart v. Clark,3" it was held that Navy regulations.
,were "automatically a part of the contract" and that "existing laws
are read into contracts in order to fix the rights and obligations
of the parties."'31
Contractually speaking, statutes and regulations should be
thought of as entering into a contract via the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference, rather than by implication.32 This contractual
doctrine of the incorporation by reference of the laws and regula-
tions of the United States has been discussed by several courts.3
29. Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D. Colo. 1968).
30. 448 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Schultz v. Resor, 332 F. Supp. 708 (D. Wisc.
1971).
31. Id. at 172. See Casella, supra note 5, at 811.
32. In Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the contract was not
presented to the court, so the court, sub silentio, implied it. Also, see Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1848), in which the court stated that an enlisted person is presumed to
have knowledge of the laws governing that branch of the service in which he enlisted. Other
courts have discussed the doctrine of constructive enlistment, which serves as a basis for
implying knowledge. See Colden v. Asmus, 332 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States
ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. King, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959); Note, Military Law-Jurisdiction: Serviceman's Im-
plied Consent to Military Status After Enlistment Term Expired Held Sufficient for Military
Jurisdiction, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384, 389 (1971). Finally, in an opinion of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army, it is stated that "an enlistment contract can be implied as well as
express." 1918 Op. JAG 488 (1918).
33. Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F.
Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968); Morse v. Boswell, 289 F. Supp. 812 (D. Md. 1968); Pfile v. Corcoran,
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The triggering phrase would be any one in the contract referring to
the "laws of the United States," "regulations of the individual serv-
ice," or other statements opening up the contract to include other
documents. This statement should also serve the function of notice
to the enlistee that his obligations are not solely governed by the
four corners of the paper he is signing.
There is no doubt that statutes and regulations are part of the
enlistment contract.3 4 The problems arise when one party to the
contract, the volunteer, is partially or totally unaware of the exist-
ence and the effect of these laws upon him. The effect of these laws
in terms of a status change from a civilian to a member of the
military, has already been discussed. Although "status" language
constantly appears in the opinions, and the statutes and regulations
must be dealt with, the laws of the country should be referred to in
the contract as part of the contract, and not as some supervening,
possibly unexpected force, which later is found to impinge upon
what the volunteer thought his rights, duties, and obligations were
at the time of contracting. This emphasis on keeping the whole
matter within the framework of contract law is the essence of the
material to follow. The enlistment agreement will now be analyzed
in strictly contractual terms to discover whether or not it should and
can be treated as an agreement coming within the traditional law
of contracts.
II. TRADITIONAL CONTRACTUAL ELEMENTS AND THE ENLISTMENT
CONTRACT
The requirements for the formation of an informal contract are:
(1) Mutual assent;
(2) Consideration;
(3) Two or more parties having at least limited legal capacity; and
(4) The agreement must not be one declared void by statute or by
rule of the common law.
35
A. Mutual Assent: Offer and Acceptance
The enlistment contract is a contract for employment whereby
287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968).
34. 53 AM. Jur. 2d Military, and Civil Defense § 138 (1970).
35. L. SIMPSON, CoNTRAcrs § 8 (2d ed. 1965).
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the volunteer offers his services and the Government accepts those
services through its agents, the military recruiters. 6 In McCord v.
Page,:7 the court stated that where no invalidity in the enlistment
was claimed, such as fraud, duress, incapacity to contract, etc., and
the volunteer of his own volition enlisted into the armed forces, the
contract was enforceable. The offer was clear, certain, and definite
so that the volunteer "was fully aware of the duties and responsibili-
ties he thereby assumed. ' '3
United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson31 addressed the question
of offer and acceptance in terms of the mutual written consent of
the parties. The court held that where an extension of an enlistment
was involved, whereby the military was the offeror and the volunteer
was the offeree, 0 the oath by the volunteer was not an essential
method of acceptance. Thus, the court apparently recognized two
methods of acceptance, the oath and the written consent.
B. Consideration
The question of just what is the consideration in an enlistment
contract has arisen in the context of bonuses and special promises
allegedly made by the military to induce an individual to enlist.
Consideration for the volunteer's services has taken many forms:
special promises regarding initial or subsequent duty assignments,
free education, monetary bonuses, and, of course, the normal mone-
tary compensation for being a member of the armed forces. All of
these forms of consideration should be viewed in the context that
the enlistment contract is an agreement for the rendering of per-
sonal services and, as such, involves the exchange of certain liberties
and freedoms by the volunteer, which he had previously enjoyed in
his civilian life, in return for the consideration given by the mili-
tary.'
36. Ex parte Blackington, 245 F. 801 (D. Mass. 1917), aff'd, 248 F. 124 (2d Cir. 1918).
37. 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941).
38. Id. at 70.
39. 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
40. Note the apparent difference in the positions of the parties regarding an original enlist-
ment and an extension of an enlistment (a separate contract, modifying the terms of the
original contract by increasing the length of obligated service). In the former, the Government
is the offeree and in the latter the Government, desiring further service from the volunteer,
becomes the offeror.
41. See Krill v. Bauer, 314 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wisc. 1970), in which the court posed the
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Matzelle v. Pratt2 involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
by an enlisted man who complained that he was being illegally
detained by the Navy by being forced to remain in active service
beyond the agreed expiration date. Petitioner originally enlisted in
the Navy for four years and soon thereafter agreed to extend his
enlistment for two additional years in return for advanced training
in electronics and the payment to him of a special reenlistment
bonus. Petitioner received the advanced training, and, during the
two-year extension, he claimed that he had not promptly received
his special bonus.13 The court held that even though the agreed-
upon consideration was not tendered promptly, time was not of the
essence and that petitioner was not entitled to rescind the extension
agreement. The court took notice of the fact that no offer of restitu-
tion for the value of the advanced education had been tendered by
the plaintiff.
An alleged promise of an officer's commission in the Air Force was
the disputed consideration in Shelton v. Brunson.4 The objective of
the petitioner's claim was the cancellation of a reenlistment con-
tract, which contained a disclaimer of all promises outside the four
corners of the instrument. Petitioner, an Air Force sergeant, had
expected to receive an officer's commission under a special program
when he completed two years of study at Colorado State University.
Although petitioner entered the commissioning program and satis-
factorily completed his schooling, he was notified that because he
did not meet the physical qualifications for becoming an officer, he
would not receive a commission.
In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner stated
that he was induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to enlist in
this educational program, alleging that he was promised that upon
question "[d]oes being in the Army curtail or suspend certain Constitutional rights?, [sic]
the answer is unqualifiedly 'yes'." Id. at 966-67. See also Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102
(2d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
42. 332 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Va. 1971).
43. Under the terms of the agreement, the normal method of such payment was in equal
annual installments in each year of the two year period of extension over the original four
year obligation. When approval is received from the Chief of Naval Personnel, the bonus
(called a VRB and granted under the Navy's Variable Reenlistment Bonus Program) can be
paid in one lump sum. In the instant case, Matzelle requested and received such approval,
but the bonus was tendered two days late. Id. at 1011.
44. 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972), modified 465
F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
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completion of the course he would be commissioned." The peti-
tioner testified that the Air Force knew of his physical defects at the
time he enlisted in the program and that he was assured he would
receive a waiver as to any physical defect that may exist. In reliance
upon these representations, he reenlisted for six years.
The district court held that the alleged consideration of the offi-
cer's commission in return for the reenlistment extension was not
part of the contract. In effect, the court used the parol evidence rule
to discount the petitioner's evidence regarding the consideration, as
the representations of a commission and the waiver were oral. The
court looked only to the enlistment instrument and gave heavy
weight to the disclaimer clause therein which stated that no promise
of any kind had been made to the petitioner except those stated in
the document. The petitioner had signed the contract including the
disclaimer, and the court denied petitioner's request for discharge
from the Air Force."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision in part and
remanded the case, holding that the statement of understanding
contained in the enlistment instrument was ambiguous with regard
to the question of petitioner's physical qualification for commission.
The court stated that if oral misrepresentations were made to the
petitioner regarding his eligibility for commissioning, he could avoid
the contract. 7
McCullough v. Seamans48 involved a habeas corpus proceeding in
which two graduates of the Air Force Adademy sought discharge
from the Air Force as conscientious objectors before completing
their active duty service requirements. The Air Force counter-
claimed for the cost of the education received by the petitioners.
The alleged consideration involved the promise by petitioners to
satisfactorily complete their education and to serve as Air Force
officers for a specified period of time in exchange for a free college
education. The court decreed the discharge of the plaintiffs, but
refused the claim for reimbursement by the Air Force. In reaching
this decision, the court disregarded the normal contract rules re-
garding failure of consideration and breach of contract.
45. 335 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
46. Id. at 189.
47. 465 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1972).




The most recent case regarding enlistment contract consideration
is Larinoff v. United States," a suit for damages, in the form of a
reenlistment bonus, similar to Matzelle v. Pratt. The court applied
strict contract law principles in awarding relief to the plaintiffs. The
court stated, inter alia:
This suit is for a reenlistment bonus, which Plaintiffs maintain is
included in the consideration delineated in their contracts. The perti-
nent terms of the contract relating to consideration state: . . . "in
consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accure
to me during the continuance of my service ..... " The term Plain-
tiffs emphasize is "pay." Section 308 of Title 37 of the United States
Code terms the reenlistment bonus (including VRB's) as "special
pay." The definitional section of Title 37 of the United States Code,
section 101(21) defines "pay" as including special pay. Therefore, the
Court determines that the Plaintiffs have made a prima facie case
that the suit . . . is founded upon a contract for compensation be-
tween the United States and its employees."
In Larinoff, the court found that the very wording of the contract
stated the consideration. Therefore the court did not have to look
outside the document itself and thereby subject itself to evidentiary
exclusions under the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule
could have been avoided in any case, in that the wording of the
contract, i.e. "pay," was ambiguous, and under an exception to the
parol evidence rule, one may look outside the written document in
order to resolve ambiguities contained therein.51
C. Capacity to Contract
1. Age
The general common law rule is that the contracts of an infant
49. Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973).
50. Id. at slip opinion 5. Other contract language which may prove to be of precedential
value regarding the issue of consideration, as well as the larger issue of treating enlistment
as a normal contract, is found at pp. 7-9 (slip opinion). The court refers to the "bargained-
for exchange" of active duty for training and the bonus; to the "inducement" of and the
"reliance" by the plaintiffs on the promised consideration; and to the fact that the contract
was a printed form by defendants and the language therein was strictly under their control,
and as a result the contract must be construed most strongly against the author of the
document, the Government.
51. L. SIWSON, CoNnucrs § 101 (2d ed. 1965).
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are voidable at the infant's option.12 However, courts have stead-
fastly refused to follow this rule in regard to military enlistment
contracts.53 The courts have, however, allowed the parent or guard-
ian to assert the voidability of such contracts where the consent of
the parent or guardian was required before the minor could enlist.54
In re Morrissey involved a federal statute which imposed the
restriction of the minimum age of 21 on persons desiring to enlist
without parental consent. The court held that the age at which an
infant shall be competent to do any acts, or perform any duties, civil
or military, depends wholly upon the legislature." The habeas cor-
pus petition of the volunteer, a lad of 17 years of age, was denied,
despite the fact that his only living parent did not give her consent
to the enlistment. The court avoided the effect of the 21 year age
requirement as set forth in the applicable statute by stating that:
.. .[T]his provision is for the benefit of the parent or guardian. It
means simply that the government will not disturb the control of
parent or guardian over his or her child without consent. It gives the
right to such parent or guardian to invoke the aid of the court and
secure the restoration of a minor to his or her control; but it gives no
privilege to the minor.57
Thus the petitioner lost since it was he who sought the relief instead
of his parent.
The opposite situation occurred in In re Grimley.8 Habeas corpus
relief was sought on the ground that the petitioner had passed the
maximum age at which the law allowed persons to enlist, the maxi-
mum age set by statute being 35 years. Petitioner was 40 years old
at the time of enlistment. The attorneys for petitioner made an
interesting point in arguing that the "reasons for holding void an
enlistment, like the present, above the maximum age are even
52. Id. at § 103.
53. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Ex parte
Beaver, 271 F. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1921); Ex parte Winfield, 236 F. 552 (E.D. Va. 1916); Ex parte
Avery, 235 F. 248 (E.D.N.C. 1916). See also H. MOYER, JUSTCE AND THE MILnTARY 36-45 (1972).
54. See 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 22(b) (1937); 53 AM. Jura. 2d Military, and Civil
Defense §§ 146-47 (1970).
55. 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
56. Id. at 159.
57. Id.
58. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
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stronger than in the case of one below the minimum age. The latter
-is a defect which time would speedily remedy, while time would only
aggravate the former by rendering the recruit constantly less 'effec-
tive' and less 'able-bodied.' ,,' The court, in denying relief, gave
great weight to the new status acquired by the petitioner and stated
that the matter of age was "merely incidental, and not of the sub-
stance of the contract.""0 The real crux of the case is that the court
refused to aid a person with unclean hands from avoiding a contract
into which he entered voluntarily and knowingly. The court posed
the question in discussing this equitable issue: "may [petitioner]
utter a falsehood to acquire a contract, and [now] plead the truth
to avoid it when the matter in respect to which the falsehood is
stated is for his benefit?" 6' The court answered this question in the
negative.
Another theory, other than the theories of a change in status and
pure equity, which has been used by courts in denying relief based
on contractual incapacity because of minority, has been the super-
vening and plenary power of Congress to raise and support armies.62
2. Insanity
The leading case in this area, In re Judge,3 involved a habeas
corpus proceeding in which the petitioner claimed that his enlist-
ment in the Air Force was void because he was insane at the time
of enlistment. Under 10 U.S.C. § 622, Congress provided that no
insane persons are to be enlisted. The court recognized this defense
to the formation of a contract, but held that the burden of showing
insanity at the time of contracting was on the petitioner and that
he had not met his burden of proof.
3. Fraud
Fraud in the inducement of an enlistment contract has often been
alleged as a ground for seeking relief." Although in the majority of
59. Id. at 148.
60. Id. at 151.
61. Id.
62. See V. infra. See also United States ex rel. Goodman v. Hearn, 153 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 667 (1946).
63. 148 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
64. Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Chalfant v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th
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cases, the plaintiff has not been granted relief, the courts have ap-
plied, on the whole, strict contract principles. There is one stum-
bling block to recovery, however, even if the misrepresentations are
proven. Usually the fraud lies in something the enlistee was prom-
ised. As a rule, the promises were given by the recruiter, an agent
of the Government, whom the courts have consistently found has no
actual authority and hence cannot bind his principal, the United
States.65
An item of inducement, a bonus, was characterized, in Larinoff
v. United States, as part of the consideration, and instead of the
court relying on the misrepresentations themselves, it preferred to
interpret the phrase in the contract concerning "pay" as including
the alleged bonus."6 Thus, even in the most recent case allowing
relief, the court strained to rest its findings on the contract docu-
ment itself, rather than on the obvious oral misrepresentations of
the recruiting agent.
Another method of dealing with fraud in the inducement, which
has not yet been discussed by any court, except in a dissenting
opinion," is the use of adhesion contract principles. 8 Although the
law of adhesion contracts is not within the typical contract law
rules, it appears that it may apply to these cases of fraud." The law
of unconscionability is also another emerging doctrine which may
fill the gap between the strict status stance of some courts and the
more general law of contract approach, taken by others, in regard
to the military enlistment.
4. Duress
The most instructive case on the use of duress to avoid an enlist-
Cir. 1969); Larinoff v. United States, Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973); Bemis
v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Wong v. Laird, 4 S.S.L.R. 3650 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd. 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.
1972), modified, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972); Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D.
Pa. 1969).
65. Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186, 189 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th
Cir. 1972), modified, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. Larinoff v. United States, Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973) (slip opinion
at 5).
67. Shelton v. Brunson, 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
68. See Casella, supra note 5, at 795-96.
69. Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion-A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 Am. J.
COMP. L. 53, 55-56 (1972); Casella, supra note 5.
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ment contract is United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman,7 in which
-a court-martial was used to coerce the signature of the plaintiff on
his enlistment contract. Plaintiff had been promised the grade of
petty officer second class after he was found qualified; but the enl-
istment contract he was tendered stated that he would only be
granted the grade of petty officer third class. For this reason, peti-
tioner refused to sign the enlistment instrument. Despite this omis-
sion, the recruiter, instead of sending petitioner away, directed him
to proceed to a processing station, and from there, to a duty station.
Petitioner was under the belief that a new contract with the correct
grade specified therein was being forwarded to him for his signature.
Soon thereafter, petitioner was ordered, on threat of prosecution via
court-martial, to sign the original enlistment contract, specifying
the lower grade. Norris then signed the contract, stating that his
signing was not voluntary but was the result of the threat of court-
martial.7' Under these facts, the court granted habeas corpus relief.
The courts appear to be split on the viability of the defense of
incapacity to contract. In cases in which equity and justice demand
and obvious facts compel a decision in accordance with traditional
contract law, the courts seem to be willing to grant relief. However,
the judiciary still appears to be reluctant to apply straight contract
law across the board in this area. The barriers of military discretion
and the paramount powers of the sovereign still seem to be sufficient
to prevent the complete breakthrough of the application of contract
law to the area of capacity to contract.72
D. Public Policy Restrictions
The final prerequisite for the formation of a simple contract is
that the purpose of the contract can not violate some overriding
public policy.73 The types of contracts which usually run afoul of this
criterion are: contracts in restraint of trade, contracts illegal be-
70. 296 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Cf. United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F.
Supp. 1261, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 431 F.2d 548, 551 (3d Cir. 1970).
71. United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-75 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
72. Some courts have, however, stated their reliance on military discretion and the tradi-
tional judicial "hands-off" approach when regarding military matters. See Mellinger v. Laird,
339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969);
Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968); Chavez v. Fergusson, 266 F. Supp. 879
(N.D. Cal. 1967), appeal dismissed, 395 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1968).
73. L. SIMPSON, CoNTRACrS § 8 (2d ed. 1965).
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cause of their being harmful to the public interests, contracts to
defraud or injure third parties, contracts harmful to the administra-
tion of justice, contracts harmful to the marriage relation, wagering
contracts, and usurious contracts.74
The military enlistment contract does not fall into any of these
categories. In fact, one of the parties to the enlistment contract, the
United States, is the maker of what is vaguely called "public pol-
icy." No case has challenged the enlistment contract as running
afoul of this criterion, and it is doubtful if any compelling argument
can be made in this area. It would be rather ironic to argue to a court
that a contract made by Congress, who supposedly represents the
public and as such echoes its policies, violates the "public policy"
of the nation.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MILITARY ENLISTMENT
DOCUMENTS
There appear to be three basic rules which courts have used to
interpret ordinary contracts: (a) words are to be given their plain
and normal meaning (except when special usage varies their normal
meaning and best effectuates the intention of the parties); (b) every
part of a contract is to be interpreted, if possible, so as to carry out
the contract's general purpose; and (c) the circumstances under
which the contract was made may always be shown in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties.75 Along with these rules have
come other doctrines regarding the certainty of terms," the reading
of the contract as a whole,77 the statute of frauds,7 8 and the parol
evidence rule.7 9
In Larinoff v. United States, Judge Richey applied several of the
above contract law rules in interpreting the enlistment extension
agreement in issue. First, since the issue in the case involved the
question of whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to special pay
for agreeing to extend their period of service, the court applied the
rule which took into account the technical usage of the word "pay"
74. Id. at § 214, et seq.
75. Id. at § 102.
76. Id. at § 43, et seq.
77. Id. at § 102; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 235(c) (1932).
78. L. SIMPSON, CoNTRACTS § 65 et seq (2d ed. 1965).
79. Id. at § 98 et seq.
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in the written agreement. Judge Richey interpreted it, by using the
-applicable statutes, to include the Variable Reenlistment Bonus
(VRB) which the plaintiffs sought."0
The court in Larinoff also applied the rule that the contract is
to be interpreted, if possible, so as to carry out the intentions of the
parties. The court found that "Congress intended that the VRB
should assist in the attraction and retention of members of the
armed forces with critical skills"8' and that the plaintiffs appar-
ently thought that the contract called for the payment of the bonus
because the bonus was in effect at the time plaintiffs signed their
reenlistment contracts.82 Finally, the court stated:
The cardinal rule of contract law that comes into play when analyzing
the language of a written instrument is that the document must be
considered in light of the situation and relationship of the parties, the
circumstances surrounding them at the time of the contract, and the
nature of the subject-matter and the apparent purpose of the con-
tract. . . . Applying this rule to the facts of this case there can be
no dispute that the Navy was using the VRB at the time the Plaintiffs
signed their extension, to induce reenlistment in critical areas.,
The case of Colden v. Asmus8 4 also made use of one of the basic
contract interpretation tenets mentioned previously. This case in-
volved a petition for habeas corpus by a Navy enlisted man on the
ground that his enlistment extension was invalid. The court held
that a Navy regulation which prescribed that attendance at one
training school, rather than at three, was a sufficient prerequisite
for extension, and was incorporated by reference into the enlistment
contract. The court further stated that ". . . the intention of the
parties to a contract must be determined from a reading of the
contract as a whole. 8 5 The petition of the plaintiff was denied, and
the extension agreement was held valid.
There have been no cases in which a plaintiff has alleged that the
80. Larinoff v. United States, Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973) (slip opinion
at 5).
81. Id. at 3 (slip opinion).
82. Id. at 7 (slip opinion).
83. Id. at 8 (slip opinion).
84. 322 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
85. Id. at 1165.
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lack of a written enlistment document vitiates the enlistment. Al-
though there is no general statute of frauds requirement on the
United States to have a signed writing by the party to be charged,
it appears that under some state statutes, a writing would be re-
quired for such an employment contract.86 However, the general rule
that the formality of a writing is unnecessary to the validity of a
contract appears to be applicable when there is other evidence that
such a contract has been entered into. 7 However, if a statute of
frauds argument were to be framed, it would have to be based on
that section of the statute which requires a signed writing for those
"contracts not to be performed within a year from the time of mak-
ing."
8 8
Unlike the nonexistence of claims based on a violation of the
statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule has undergone much scru-
tiny by the courts in the enlistment area.89 In Petition of Agustin,"0
the court allowed into evidence the oral evidence as to the taking of
the oath of allegiance, and specifically stated that "[p]arol evi-
dence is admissible to establish the fact of enlistment."9' Other
courts, while not specifically mentioning the parol evidence rule,
have prohibited evidence of this nature by the use of disclaimer
clauses in the written document itself, which clauses state that no
promises, other than those specified in this document, have been
made.2
86. In re Cohen, 15 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); LaBett v. Heyman Bros., Inc., 13 N.J.
Misc. 832, 181 A. 638 (1935), afl'd, 117 N.J.L. 115, 187 A. 36 (1936). See generally, L. SIMPsON,
CONTRACTS § 82 (2d ed. 1965).
87. Examples include part or substantial performance by one party, detrimental reliance
on the contract, and acceptance of the benefits under the contract. See generally, L. SMSON,
CONTRACTS § 65 et seq (2d ed. 1965).
88. Id. at 82.
89. Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Chalfant v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1969); Haines v. Laird, Civil No. 71-2814-MML (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 6, 1972); Mellinger
v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Agustin, 62 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
See also 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 21(a)(4) (1937).
90. 62 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
91. Id. at 835. See also Lebanion v. Heath, 47 N.H. 353 (1867); 6 C.J.S. Army and
Navy § 21(a)(4) (1937).
92. Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Chalfant v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1969); Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th




A condition is any fact or event other than lapse of time which quali-
fies a promisor's present duty of performance."
An instructive case on the use of this contractual element is
Bemis v. Whalen,9 a case in which the triggering event was the
enlistment by the petitioner, and the promised occurrence was the
sending of the petitioner to electronics school. The court held that
no breach of this condition occurred when the plaintiff was sent to
a similar school, but was not sent, until six months later, to a school
in the exact specialty he was allegedly guaranteed. It appears that
the court was persuaded by two factors. The first factor was that the
plaintiff had signed a disclaimer clause which negated all promises
made to him and which also stated that he had had the contract
explained to him. The second factor was that the court felt that
plaintiff did finally receive the "benefit of his bargain" in that he
was sent to the special school, albeit six months after the date he
had been promised. The court stated:
The only variance between the literal terms of the contract and the
actual performance of the contract is that part of the bargained-for
terms were delayed for six months. It does not appear that time was
of the essence, as it relates to the 5900 MOS (the special school to
which he was to be sent) . . .
It is important to note, however, that the court recognized the
doctrine of contractual conditions as applying to military enlist-
ments. Especially important is that the court recognized the types
of conditions, such as material and minor, even though it held that
the alleged breach (the six month delay) was not material. The
court did not state, however, that the condition specifying that the
plaintiff would be sent to the particular school was a minor condi-
tion, but only that the breach of this apparently material condition
was not sufficient to allow a remedy for the plaintiff. Thus, it can
be stated with some authority that courts do recognize that certain
conditions are material in military enlistments and that in the in-
93. L. SIMPSON, CoNTRAcrs § 144 (2d ed. 1965).
94. 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
95. Id. at 1292.
19741
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
stant case, if petitioner never had received the promised schooling,
he might have been able to sue for a breach of a material condition.
Another case which demonstrates the recognition of the validity
of conditions in a military enlistment is Shelton v. Brunson." In-
volved was the condition of the petitioner's finishing two years of
university training, and the promise that the Air Force would give
petitioner a waiver of his physical disabilities in order that he could
become an officer. The lower court, relying on the lack of actual
authority by the agents of the Air Force and on the traditional
doctrine that courts would not interfere in military matters,9" re-
fused to recognize a breach of the promised waiver, an obviously
material condition, and held that the Air Force could refuse the
waiver and hence, the officer's commission. 8 The Court of Appeals
later remanded the case on the issues of ambiguity in the contrac-
tual condition of waiver and oral misrepresentation.9
V. MODIFICATION OF MILITARY ENLISTMENTS
Sometimes a fine line is drawn between a modification of a con-
tract and a breach of a contract. The difference, traditionally, has
been that in a subsequent modification, the mutual consent of both
parties to the contract is necessary, consideration is required, and
in many cases the modification has to be in writing to satisfy the
statute of frauds.'"' In the enlistment area, however, courts have
seen fit to dispense with all these prerequisites to modification and
have allowed contracts to be unilaterally modified by the Govern-
ment under the guise of supervening public policy.'"' The founda-
96. 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972), modified, 465
F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
97. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
98. Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186, 189 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th
Cir. 1972), modified, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
100. L. SIMPSON, CONTRACrS § 92 et seq (2d ed. 1965).
101. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Antonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir.
1971); Schwartz v. Franklin, 412 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969); Ex parte Beaver, 271 F. 493 (N.D.
Ohio 1921); Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Adams v. Clifford, 294 F.
Supp. 1318 (D. Hawaii 1969); Morse v. Boswell, 289 F. Supp. 812 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 401
F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1052 (1969); Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp.
554 (D. Colo. 1968); Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 390
F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968), appeal denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968), rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 896
(1968); Jones v. Loomey, 107 F. Supp. 624 (D. Mich. 1952). Cf. Gion v. McNamara, Civil
No. 67-1563-EC (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 9, 1968).
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tion for this claim of "supervening public policy" by the Govern-
ment has been the war powers of Congress' 2 and the power of the
President to regulate the military as its Commander-in-Chief. 3
The first category of cases in which this "super-policy" has been
used to change the terms of enlistment contracts is demonstrated
by the case of Antonuk v. United States."4 This case involved a
petition for habeas corpus by an Army reservist who had been re-
called to active duty because of his excessive absences at his reserve
drill meetings. One of the issues in the case concerned the period
for which the petitioner was obligated to serve on active duty. His
enlistment contract expressly stated that the call-up period would
be no more than 45 days,' 5 but subsequent to the contract a new
statute was passed allowing the call-up period to be as much as two
years.' 6 In the petitioner's case, the call-up was to be for a period
of one year, six months, and three days.'0 7 The court held that Con-
gress may abrogate the terms of reservist enlistment contracts and
joined "the vast majority of courts which have held that reservists
may be activated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 673a, notwithstanding
clauses in their enlistment contracts to the contrary."'' 8
The second category of cases concerns situations in which the
reservists are called to active duty, not because of unsatisfactory
performance at drill meetings, but under a statute which states that
the President can activate forces when "he deems it necessary. 10 9
In Goldstein v. Clifford,"0 reservists, who were activated pursuant
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
104. 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971).
105. Id. at 598.
106. Id. See 10 U.S.C. § 673(a) (1971) and 32 C.F.R. § 100.3(c) (1973).
107. Antonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1971).
108. Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1972); Harmonson v. United States, No. 24005
(9th Cir., filed July 1970), rev'g Civil No. 68-2109,2 S.S.L.R. 3151 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Karpinski
v. Resor, 419 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1969); Schwartz v. Franklin, 412 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969);
Winters v. United States, 412 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1969); Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Heuchan v. Laird, 314 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 980
(8th Cir. 1970); Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Adams v. Clifford,
294 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Hawaii 1969); Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968);
Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 879
(2d Cir. 1968). Contra, Gion v. McNamara, Civil No. 67-1563-EC (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 9,
1968). See also Ansted v. Resor, 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1971); Mickey v. Barclay, 328 F. Supp.
1108 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
109. 10 U.S.C. § 263 (1970).
110. 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968).
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to this statute, cited a provision in their enlistment contracts which
provided that they could be ordered to active duty only "in the
event of a mobilization or emergency.""' The reservists challenged
their activation on the ground that the Executive Order issued pur-
suant to the statute violated due process and was a misreading and
abrogation of their contract rights."2 The court, avoiding the issue
of an apparent modification of the original contract, preferred to
rest its denial of relief on the ground that the statutory law, as well
as the enlistment instrument itself, constituted the contract in
issue. The court found no conflict in the wording, hence, no uncon-
stitutional or contractual modification."'
Another modification situation occurs when a member of the mili-
tary commits a criminal offense, and his period of enlistment runs
out before he can be court-martialed." 4 Courts have sanctioned a
modification of the contract by allowing the member to be retained
on active duty until he can be court-martialed, despite the fact that
the terms of his contract state that he will be released from duty on
a specific day, and despite the obvious fact that there was no mutual
consent by the parties, nor consideration for the extension.
VI. BREACH
Any unjustified failure to perform when performance is due is a
breach of contract which entitles the injured party to damages. If the
breach is slight or insubstantial, it is called a partial breach, for
which plaintiff's damages are restricted to compensation for the
defective performance. If the breach is material, it is called a total
breach, which gives to the injured party an election to substitute for
his contractual rights the remedial right to damages for total failure
of performance."5
11. Id. at 277-78.
112. Id. at 279.
113. Id.
114. Gorko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963) (court-martial jurisdic-
tion upheld where enlistment expired between first trial and rehearing); Ex parte Beaver, 271
F. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1921); Roman v. Curtis, 291 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1968), application for
a stay of court-martial denied, 393 U.S. 921 (1968); United States v. Schuering, 16
U.S.M.C.A. 324, 36 C.M.R. 480 (1966).




Despite the language of several courts"' which refuse to follow
contract law regarding breach in this area of enlistments, at least
one court has given full contractual explication of this element of
contracts.)"7 Bemis v. Whalen was a suit for habeas corpus relief
based on the grounds of false representation and breach of contract.
The court extensively discussed the issue of breach, assuming sub
silentio that it was applicable to such an enlistment contract. The
court held that although there was a breach, it was not a material
one, and the plaintiff was denied relief. The court stated, inter alia:
Enlistment is a contract between the United States and the enlistee
and, in the absence of supervening statute, is governed by general
principles of contract law. . . . A party induced by fraud or mistake
to enter into a contract may rescind that contract . . . . Whether a
given breach is material or essential, or not, is a question of fact.",
In Adams v. Clifford,"' the court held that the activation of a
reserve unit, pursuant to a statute enacted after its members had
signed their enlistment agreements and which statute contravened
these agreements, did not amount to a breach of contract entitling
the 283 plaintiffs to damages. The court avoided characterizing this
unexpected activation as a breach by resting its decision on the
status which the plaintiffs had assumed when they enlisted. The
court stated that this change in status made the plaintiffs subject
to the overriding powers of the Congress and the President.' 21
VII. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Although few courts have characterized in express terms a failure
of performance by the Government to be an actionable breach
thereby making the United States accountable to the enlistee for
appropriate remedies, many courts have discussed the remedies
sought by plaintiffs for this failure of performance.' 2' This section
116. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961); Inre Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Antonuk
v. United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971); Adams v. Clifford, 294 F. Supp. 1318 (D.
Hawaii 1969); Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968). For an excellent discus-
sion of this position see Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554, 560-61 (D. Colo. 1968).
117. Bemis v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
118. Id. at 1291.
119. 294 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Hawaii 1969).
120. Id. at 1322.
121. Miller v. Chafee, 462 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1972); Nixon v. Secretary of the Navy, 422
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will examine the basic remedies which plaintiffs have sought and
courts have grappled with in their treatment of enlistments.
A. Damages
Damages is the basic remedy for breach of contract, and "every
breach entitles the party injured to sue" for them.'22 There have
been two cases in which plaintiffs have sought money damages for
breach of an enlistment contract. In Adams v. Clifford, 283 Army
reservists brought suit for a court order stating that the retroactive
application of a statute calling them up to active duty was invalid
and "that the issuance of unlawful orders [pursuant to the statute]
breached each [of their] enlistment contract[s], and prevented
each enlistee 'from transacting . . . [his] business and [each has]
suffered great financial loss' in a sum of less [sic] than $10,000, and
asked compensatory damages therefore.' 23 The court refused the
requested relief, finding no breach and based its decision on the
supervening powers of the President and Congress.' 21
In Larinoff v. United States,'5 the court granted compensatory
damages, including in its opinion, an admonition to the defendant
Navy:
If the Defendants did not want to be committed to the payment of a
VRB, they should have made a self-evident provision in the contract.
The printed form contract after all, was drafted solely by the Defen-
dants; its language was entirely within their control.'"'
This granting of a monetary recovery against the Government in
a case founded on breach of contract is a clear portent of how the
F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1970); Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Larinoff v. United
States, Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973); McCullough v. Seamans, 348 F. Supp.
511 (E.D. Cal. 1972); Bemis v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Matzelle v. Pratt,
332 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Va. 1971); Brehm v. Seamans, Civil No. 70 Civ. 2905 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Aug. 17, 1970); Adams v. Clifford, 294 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Hawaii 1969); United States
v. Averick, 249 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
122. L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 195 (2d ed. 1965).
123. Adams v. Clifford, 294 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D. Hawaii 1969). The court probably
meant to state that plaintiff alleged a sum of more than $10,000 because at least $10,000 is
required for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
124. See V. infra.
125. Civil No. 626-73 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28, 1973). Note that Larinoff is presently pending
appeal.
126. Id. at 8-9 (slip opinion).
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courts may, in the future, view military enlistment, i.e., as a normal
contract. Although plaintiffs sought discharge from the Navy (res-
cission of the contract), the basic contract principle that if damages
are an adequate remedy,'1 such damages will be the relief granted,
was the court's solution.
B. Rescission, Reformation, and Restitution
Nixon v. Secretary of the Navy'2 involved a suit for cancellation
of an extension of an enlistment agreement, in which the cancella-
tion (rescission) was based on a Navy regulation,'29 rather than on
a straight contract theory. Although the plaintiff's request for can-
cellation was timely, the court denied relief, because even though
the purpose of the contract was not realized (plaintiff becoming a
qualified nuclear power plant operator), he had received some of the
benefits under the agreement. The Navy rule allowing cancellation
applied only to those persons who had not yet received "any of the
benefits" contemplated by the extension agreement, such as ad-
vancement to a higher pay grade, schooling in technical fields, etc.'3
Rescission under contract law rather than under a Navy regula-
tion was sought in Matzelle v. Pratt.13' The basis on which rescission
was sought was that the plaintiff had received a promised bonus
payment two days late. The court found that this was not a material
breach entitling the plaintiff to rescission, and rested its decision on
strict contract law:
Counsel agree that this case is governed by the law of contracts. On
that basis, the question is whether Matzelle is entitled to rescission
of the contract. It seems clear that if Matzelle is entitled to any relief,
rescission is not an appropriate remedy.
A general principle of contract law is that rescission should be permit-
127. See note 115 supra.
128. 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1970).
129. Id. at 937-38. See also Kubitschek v. Chafee, 469 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1972); Johnson
v. Chaffee, 469 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1972). In Kubitschek and Johnson, the courts held that
the taking of an oath before a warrant officer instead of a commissioned officer (which
violated the Navy's Personnel Manual) was a minor defect in the execution of the enlistment,
and rescission was denied.
130. Id. at 938. For a discussion of receiving benefits under an enlistment agreement, see
H. MoYER, JUSTICE AND THE MiLrrARY 30-33, 35 (1972).
131. 332 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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ted only when the complaining party has suffered a breach so mate-
rial and substantial in nature that it affects the very essence of the
contract and serves to defeat the object of the parties. . . . Assuming
. . . that failure to pay the bonus on September 21 amounts to a
breach, a delay of two days is plainly not so material and substantial
as to justify rescission.' 3'
The court suggested that restitution to the Navy for the value of
the education given the plaintiff would have strengthened his claim
for rescission, since contract law does not allow a person to retain
the benefits of a contract which he is now claiming to have been
breached by the other party.'33 Another case recognizing the applic-
ability of the remedy of rescission to enlistment contracts is Bemis
v. Whalen. Again rescission was denied because the plaintiff had
received the benefits of the contract, and the breach was not
"total."
Gausmann v. Laird'34 was a case in which the plaintiff sought
rescission of the contract, or in the alternative, reformation of his
enlistment on the basis that he was guaranteed that he would be
assigned to duty in Europe and never would be assigned to the war
in Vietnam. The court, although denying relief, recognized the appl-
icability of both of these remedies for breach of contract.3 '
There are two recent cases in which the Government, as opposed
to our volunteer, has sought the application of contract principles.'36
This is a contrast from the usual position of the Government, which
is usually the defendant trying to hide behind the "supervening
policy" and "hands-off the military" arguments in attempting to
get the court to disregard standard contract law. In Miller v.
Chafee,137 the court stated in response to an attempted condition of
repayment to the Government of education expenditures:
. . . Miller was entitled to be honorably discharged. . . [His] ap-
132. Id. at 1012.
133. Id. at 1012-13.
134. 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969).
135. Id. at 395.
136. Miller v. Chafee, 462 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1972); McCullough v. Seamans, 348 F. Supp.
511 (E.D. Cal. 1972). See Albrecht, Recovery of Government-Funded Education Expenses
From Naval Officers Who Request Discharge by Reason of Conscientious Objection, 26 JAG
J. 157 (1972).
137. 462 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1972).
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plication made out a case for conscientious objector status, and the
Government does not argue to the contrary. . . . Finally, we hold
that the District Court improperly conditioned Miller's release upon
his making monetary payments to the Government. . . .It attached
an unauthorized burden upon Miller's exercise of his right to seek
conscientious objector status, impairing his First Amendment
rights.' 3
In McCullough v. Seamans,3 ' Air Force academy graduates
sought and received a judgment declaring them to be conscientious
objectors. The court held, however, that they were under no legal
obligation to reimburse the Air Force for the cost of their education.
It seems logical that if contractual principles are to be followed
by the courts in this area, those principles should apply equally to
both parties. The rationale for the denial of restitution in the Miller
and McCullough cases is that the law of contracts must not conflict
with or interfere with a higher set of principles embodied in the area
of constitutional law, i.e., chilling the free exercise of religion for
conscientious objectors. However, where no such first amendment
rights are involved, the courts should allow restitution and rescis-
sion to all contracting parties in the enlistment. This would adhere
to the basic contract doctrine of mutuality of remedy.
C. Specific Performance
An enlistment contract is a personal services or employment con-
tract. It is almost universally held that a contract for personal serv-
ices will not be specifically enforced, either by affirmative decree or
by an injunction. 4 ' The general rule is apparently not applicable to
enlistment contracts, since the courts have, in effect, ordered spe-
cific performance in the many different situations which have al-
ready been discussed.' In reality, every time a court denies relief
by way of a discharge, it is enforcing the contract so as to make the
138. Id. at 338. But see Brehm v. Seamans, Civil No. 70 Civ. 2905 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug.
17, 1970) in which a stipulation between the Government and the plaintiff for restitution by
the latter was recognized as valid and was incorporated into the court's order.
139. 348 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Benway v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp.
483 (D.R.I. 1969).
140. 5A A. Coaanw, CoNTmACTs § 1204 (1964).
141. These are: extension of enlistment for court-martial, extension of period of activation
for reserves, and use of the "supervening public policy" of the Government. See, e.g., Messina
v. Commanding Officer, 342 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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volunteer specifically perform. In a normal personal services con-
tract, although there is no right to breach, there is the power to
breach the contract with the added assurance that a court will not
make the breaching party specifically perform.
The argument of "involuntary servitude" has long stood as a bar-
rier to the specific performance of a personal employment con-
tract.'42 Surely, this argument is no more applicable than in the
present context of the enlistment. Other arguments which have
been advanced against specific performance include: the difficulty
of enforcing the decree, the difficulty of gauging the quality of the
work performed, and the undesirability of continuing the relation-
ship between employer and employee after the loyalty, confidence,
and association have been challenged or destroyed.'43 No cases have
expressly discussed the question of making a volunteer specifically
perform, but the basic rationale which has precluded any considera-
tion of this contractual issue has been the all-encompassing super-
vening power of the Government in dealing with its military forces.
Until this mantle of protection can be completely removed from
enlistment agreement negotiations, it is unlikely that the issue will
arise.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
One basic theme of this article has been the increasing interest
of the courts in viewing the enlistment agreement as a true contract,
governed by traditional contract law. Although the courts have not
yet arrived at the point where only contract law will be considered
in deciding disputes of this nature, it seems apparent that the lan-
guage of the opinions sound more and more like that time is coming.
The main objection to the use of contract law has been by the
military and by the Government, while on the other hand, in most
cases it is the volunteer who is urging its use. The reason for the
former's reluctance to submit to contract law is based on the ves-
tiges of the sovereign immunity doctrine.' It is true that the Gov-
ernment should be unhindered in the performance of its functions,
142. 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1204, at 401 (1964).
143. Id. at 400-01.
144. Sovereign power has also prevented the assertion of such doctrines as equitable estop-
pel. See United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965).
145. See Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554, 559-60 (D. Colo. 1968).
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but by placing these types of agreements involving an individual's
personal freedom under the law of contracts, it would seem that the
Government is not being put in a unduly fettered position and
would still be free to perform adequately."'
The best method for this transition to the use of strict contract
law is the inclusion in the contract itself, in express terms, of all the
contingencies which can affect the performance of the contract and
both parties' obligations and duties thereunder. This approach is a
necessity because the question of whether the agreement between
the volunteer and the Government is an actual "arms-length bar-
gain" is a real one.4 7 This suggested approach already has been
implemented in some instances by the use of "general clauses"
which state that the contract is subject to the laws of the United
States and other vague descriptions of the possible contingencies,
as well as the use of disclaimers."' A more specific statement is, in
this author's opinion, necessary.
An awareness of the rights and liabilities an enlistee or volunteer
incurs at the time of his signing of the enlistment agreement is
absolutely necessary, "9 and the enlistee should also be made aware
of any future possibilities which will alter his obligations. Until the
principles of contract law are implemented, the redress for these
abrupt changes in the agreement is quite limited. The use of con-
tract law will also further due process'50 and general fairness by
giving notice to the volunteer of all possible contingencies. In order
for the enlistment to be legitimately termed a "contract," these
prerequisites must be met, and the unfortunate characterization of
enlistment as being a change in status will be banished forever in
the catacombs of sovereign supremacy.
146. Further authority for this position can be found in the "contract clause" of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See B. WRGmrr, TaE CoNTRACr CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTrION (1938). Although the "contract clause" only expressly applies to the states, it
would arguably appear to be applicable to the Federal Government as well through the fifth
amendment's due process clause.
147. See Casella, supra note 5, at 793-99. Cf. Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.
1971).
148. See Antonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Stone
v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970); Sheldon v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972), modified, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972); Even v.
Clifford, 287 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
149. See Garmon v. Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206, 211-12 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (no knowing and
voluntary relinquishment of an understood right).
150. Cf. Dellaverson y. Laird, 351 F. Supp. 134, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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